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Abstract In the tradition of Afriat (Int Econ Rev 8:67–77, 1967), Diewert (Rev Econ
Stud 40:419–425, 1973) and Varian (Econometrica 50:945–972, 1982), we provide a
revealed preference characterisation of exact linear aggregation. This guarantees that
aggregate demand can be written as a function of prices and aggregate income alone,
while abstracting from income-distributional aspects.We also establish nonparametric
conditions for individual consumption to be representable in terms of Gorman Polar
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Form preferences. Our results are simple and complement those of Gorman (1953,
1961). We illustrate the practical usefulness of our results by means of an empirical
application to a Spanish balancedmicrodata panel.We find strong evidence against the
existence of a limited set of representative agents, which in turn seems to empirically
support the need for (macroeconomic) models using a continuum of heterogeneous
agents.
Keywords Aggregation · Revealed preference · Gorman Polar Form preferences ·
Representative agent
JEL Classification C14 · D11 · D12 · E21
1 Introduction
Many models in the theoretical and empirical literature on macroeconomics, inter-
national trade and industrial organisation assume, at least implicitly, that aggregate
demand is invariant to changes in the income distribution over individual consumers
and, hence, that aggregate demand depends only on prices and aggregate income. The
best known theoretical results on this topic are probably those ofGorman (1953, 1961),
whomade explicit the conditions onmicroeconomic consumer behaviour under which
aggregate demand can be written as a function of prices and aggregate income alone.1
Specifically, Gorman showed that exact linear aggregation is possible if and only if
consumers have preferences of the Gorman Polar Form such that the corresponding
linear Engel curves have common slopes. The empirical literature on consumer behav-
iour, however, has consistently tended to show that these conditions do not hold in
practice. Lewbel and Pendakur (2009), for example, provide strong parametric evi-
dence of nonlinear Engel curve behaviour whilst Blundell et al. (2007) consider semi-
and nonparametric evidence for this non-linearity.
In this paper, we revisit the problem that Gorman addressed. We too seek necessary
and sufficient conditions for exact linear aggregation. However, we do this from a
rather different perspective, that of the nonparametric revealed preference tradition of
Samuelson (1938, 1948), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982). Instead of
describing the restrictions on behaviour in terms of the derivatives of certain functions
(the slopes of Engel curves, for example), this approach works by characterising them
in terms of a finite system of inequalities involving the consumers’ observed choices
only.
Finding a nonparametric equivalent toGorman’s aggregation theorems is, of course,
of a certain amount of theoretical interest, but this is not our only motivation: we
are also interested in empirical implementation. In particular we are interested in
whether it may be possible empirically to analyse microdata for its aggregation prop-
erties without resorting to regression analysis. Regression analysis, in the words of
1 Exact linear aggregation is to be distinguished from exact nonlinear aggregation,where aggregate demand
is a function of some representative level of aggregate income, which itself can be a function of the
distribution of income over the individuals. See, for example, Muellbauer (1975, 1976) and Jerison (1994)
for more discussion.
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Daniel McFadden in his presidential address to the Econometric Society, “interposes
an untidy veil between econometric analysis and the propositions of economic theory”.
In fact McFadden was discussing parametric regression but nonparametric regression
is not immune from the same observation. If the implications of economic theory are
described in terms of the shapes of functions implied by the theory (e.g. Engel curves)
then any empirical investigation of the theory requires those functions to be estimated
from data. As a result, the conclusions from such an exercise necessarily rest jointly
on the validity of the hypothesis at stake plus a number of crucial auxiliary statistical
assumptions necessary to deliver consistent estimates of the functions of interest. This
is the case whether the estimates are parametric, semi-parametric or nonparametric.
For example both Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) and Blundell et al. (2007) provide
evidence based on pooled cross-section data—they therefore need to make a number
of carefully chosen auxiliary assumptions about the form of unobserved heterogene-
ity and how it enters the model in order to deliver their estimates. Both studies also
need to follow an instrumental variables strategy which also brings with it a set of
important identifying assumptions. Revealed preference methods do not require the
identification or estimation of structural functions. Instead they involve only inequality
restrictions on the observables alone. As a result they are, to a great extent, free of the
need for auxiliary hypotheses. They therefore allow researchers to focus with much
greater clarity on the hypothesis at the core. Furthermore, they are applicable when
there are only very few observations and, hence, when statistical methods would be
infeasible or uninformative.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we establish the nonpara-
metric counterparts of Gorman’s aggregation conditions. We start by providing a
revealed preference characterisation of Gorman Polar Form preferences for an indi-
vidual consumer. We then propose an easy-to-implement necessary and sufficient test
for Gorman’s conditions for exact linear aggregation. Secondly, we demonstrate the
practical usefulness of our results through an empirical investigation using a balanced
microdata panel of Spanish households. Our first main conclusion here will be that
we strongly reject exact linear aggregation when focusing on the set of all rational
households in our sample. Our second main result is that this rejection is primarily due
to heterogeneity in themarginal utility of income. To investigate this heterogeneity, we
also considered the possible partitioning of our sample of households into subsets for
which exact linear aggregation holds.We conducted two exercises. Firstly, we partition
our sample on a standard set of observable household characteristics. Again, however,
we find that exact linear aggregation is rejected for each thus defined subset of house-
holds. Secondly, we use a slight adaptation of a method introduced by Crawford and
Pendakur (2013) to define a partitioning that accounts for possibly unobserved house-
hold characteristics. Essentially, this method identifies the minimal number of subsets
of households such that each individual subset is consistent with exact linear aggrega-
tion. We conclude that we need a substantial number of groups (revealing unobserved
heterogeneity) for the observed household consumption to be exactly aggregable.
Summarizing, given the nonparametric nature of our tests, our empirical results
provide robust evidence against the existence of a representative agent. This comple-
ments the already existing empirical evidence (see, for example, Kirman 1992 and
Carroll 2000), but now from a revealed preference perspective. Moreover, we also
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show that the existence of a limited set of representative agents seems to be a very
unrealistic hypothesis. As wewill discuss more in detail in Sect. 3, we interpret all this
as providing empirical support to macroeconomic models working with a continuum
of heterogeneous agents, such as the so-called standard incomplete markets models
(see, for example, Heathcote et al. 2009).
As a final point, we remark that the revealed preference approach that we follow
in this paper is completely deterministic and static in nature. First, in its pure form,
it defines testable conditions that ignore any source of randomness in the data, which
excludes formal statistical hypothesis testing. Importantly, however, it is possible to
formally account for statistical issues by combining the exact aggregation conditions
that we present below with methodological tools that have been presented in alterna-
tive revealed preference contexts. For example, it is fairly straightforward to account
for measurement error by combining our results with an original proposal of Varian
(1985). Next, we could account for random utility considerations by integrating our
analysis with the one of McFadden and Richter (1991). To focus our discussion, we
will not explicitly discuss these extensions in the current paper. Finally, as in Gor-
man (1953, 1961), we focus on a static framework, which makes it easier to define
the concept of a representative agent. However, this of course implies that we ignore
intertemporal aspects such as habit formation and/or saving decisions.2 To address
these issues, we should for instance integrate the revealed preference characteriza-
tions on the life-cycle rational expectations hypothesis (see Browning 1989) and/or
habit formation (see Crawford 2010) into our framework. We see all these points as
interesting developments for follow-up research.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains our main
theoretical results, which provide a revealed preference characterisation of individual
Gorman Polar Form preferences and an easy-to-implement necessary and sufficient
nonparametric test for exact linear aggregation. Section 3 presents our empirical appli-
cation. Section 4 concludes.
2 Exact linear aggregation: a nonparametric characterisation
In this section, we start by briefly reviewing the revealed preference conditions for
rational consumption behaviour of individual consumers in terms of the well-known
Afriat inequalities. Then, we investigate the conditions needed to guarantee exact lin-
ear aggregation, i.e. aggregate demand only depends on aggregate income and is not
affected by how the income is actually distributed across consumers. From the func-
tional derivative-based literature, we know that this independence result applies if and
only if consumers have preferences of the Gorman Polar Form and linear Engel curves
with common slopes. From this, we can define our revealed preference counterparts
of these Gorman-type aggregation conditions. We will proceed in two main steps.
Firstly, we derive a revealed preference characterisation of individual preferences of
the Gorman Polar Form. Subsequently, we present the revealed preference version
2 See, for instance, Carrasco et al. (2005), who present empirical evidence for the presence of habits for
the same Spanish panel data.
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of Gorman’s aggregation conditions stated above. This will define an easy-to-apply
linear test for exact linear aggregation.
Before moving on, it is worth pointing out the well-established fact that the Gorman
Polar Form does not necessarily give rise towell-behaved preferences in all parts of the
quantity-space: in general, well-behaved preferences only apply to a limited range of
possible income values. For instance, for some income values, the linear Engel curves
may lead to negative consumption or cross with each other. To avoid such problems,
Gorman Polar Form preferences are usually defined subject to bounds on possible
income levels.3 To keep the exposition simple, our following analysis only considers
income values that lie within such income ranges and, thus, we will not explicitly con-
sider income bounds in our exposition. But it should be kept in mind that our following
characterisations of Gorman Polar Form preferences and exact linear aggregation are
essentially “local” in that they apply to sufficiently small changes in the incomes of
individual consumers. In our proof of Theorem 2, we indicate how the relevant income
bounds can be computed in empirical applications [see our discussion of program (3)
in Appendix 1].
2.1 Gorman Polar Form preferences
Suppose that we have a balanced microdata panel of consumers indexed by h =
1, ..., H observed over a number of periods indexed t = 1, ..., T . For each consumer
h we observe non-negative consumption quantities qht ∈ RK+ , where K is the number
of goods. Following Gorman (1953), we make the classical assumption that the law
of one price holds (i.e. all households face the same price) and that prices are strictly





η = {1, ..., H} and τ = {1, ..., T } being the index sets for consumers and periods,
respectively. We will use Qt = ∑h∈η qht to denote the aggregate demand vector in
period t , so that the macrodata are {pt ,Qt }t∈τ . Aggregate income is denoted by Yt
and is equal to p′t
∑
h∈η qht = p′tQt .
Individual rationality. We will assume that all the consumers are rational in the sense
that observed demand results from themaximisation of a well-behaved utility function
subject to an individual budget constraint. Throughout, we will assume that utility
functions are well-behaved (i.e. monotonically increasing, concave and continuous).
We can formally define individual rationality as follows:
Definition 1 (Individual rationalisation) A well-behaved utility function uh provides








) ≥ uh (q) for all q with p′tq ≤ p′tqht .
For our following discussion it is useful to bemore specific about the empirical con-
tent of individual rationalisation. A core result in the revealed preference approach to
demand is that there exists a utility function that provides an individual rationalisation
3 See, for example, Pollak (1971) and Blackorby et al. (1978) for a more detailed discussion on the local
nature of Gorman Polar Form preferences.
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t∈τ if and only if the data satisfy thewell-knownAfriat inequalities.
This is formally captured by Afriat’s Theorem (Varian 1982; based on Afriat 1967):
Theorem 1 (Afriat’s Theorem) The following statements are equivalent:





(1.B). For all t ∈ τ , there exist numbers uht ∈ R+ and βht ∈ R++ that satisfy the
Afriat inequalities, i.e. for all s, t ∈ τ :









t∈τ that can be rationalised by
a well-behaved utility function needs to satisfy the Afriat inequalities. These Afriat
inequalities are linear inequalities that are expressed in the unknowns uht and β
h
t and
that can easily be verified.4 They also allow us to obtain an explicit construction of
the utility levels and the marginal utility of income associated with each observation
t : they define a utility level uht and a marginal utility of income β
h
t (associated with
the observed income p′tqht ) for each observed qht . As has been demonstrated by Varian
(1982), and later by Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2008) and Blundell
et al. (2015), the above insights can be used to formally evaluate policy reforms in
terms of individual welfare by computing, for instance, bounds on equivalent and
compensating variations.
Gorman Polar Form preferences. We next define what it means for the data of an
individual consumer to be rationalisable with the Gorman Polar Form. The Gorman
Polar Form is usually defined in terms of an indirect utility function wh . Let yh
represent the income of consumer h. The indirect utility function wh is connected












We can now state the next definition.





nalisable by the Gorman Polar Form if there exists a utility function uh that provides
an individual rationalisation of the data and if there exists an associated indirect utility
function wh(p, yh) = yh−ah(p)
bh(p)
, with ah(p) ∈ R and bh(p) ∈ R++ for all p and the
functions ah and bh homogeneous of degree 1.
In this definition, the price index ah(p) is often interpreted as subsistence
expenditure—although this interpretation is not always valid (see Pollak 1971, p.
403, fn. 4)—while the price index bh(p) is interpreted as the inverse of the marginal
utility of income.




t∈τ that can be rationalised by a well-behaved utility
function will also satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). We opted to keep our
statement of Afriat’s Theorem in line with our following discussion, which will focus on Afriat inequalities.
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We can then state the characterisation.5





t∈τ are rationalisable by the Gorman Polar Form.
(2.B). For all t ∈ τ, there exist numbers wht ∈ R+, aht ∈ R and bht ∈ R++ such that
for all s, t ∈ τ :














aht = δahs and bht = δbhs if pt = δps for δ ∈ R++. (2.B.3)
Similar to Theorem 1, the numbers in this result have certain structural interpre-
tations. Condition (2.B.1), for example, is an Afriat inequality which allows us to









vation t . We can interpret every wht as an indirect utility value (the function value





sumer behaviour). Condition (2.B.2) then states the Gorman Polar Form restriction,
with the numbers aht and b
h
t corresponding to the price indices a
h(p) and bh(p) in
Definition 2 evaluated atpt .6 Condition (2.B.3), finally, imposes homogeneity of these
price indices.
Two final notes are in order. Firstly, the Gorman Polar Form characterisation in
Theorem 2 is nonlinear in aht and b
h
t . However, in our proof of Theorem 2 we show
that it can be equivalently expressed in linear form. Thismakes it computationally very
convenient. Secondly, in the absence of proportional price movements, Gorman Polar
Form preferences provide no additional restrictions over and above the standard Afriat
inequalities stated in Theorem 1.7 In other words, Gorman Polar Form preferences and
rational preferences are nonparametrically (in the revealed preference sense) equiva-
lent: for data in which proportional price movements are not observed their empirical
implications are identical.8
5 An alternative revealed preference characterisation of the Gorman Polar Form can be found in work in
progress by Brown and Shannon. In a certain sense, the work of these authors is complementary to ours
as Brown and Shannon characterise Gorman Polar Form preferences in terms of so-called ‘dual’ Afriat
numbers (which have an interpretation in terms of indirect utility functions; see Brown and Shannon 2000),
whereas our analysis starts from the original ‘primal’ Afriat numbers (to be interpreted in terms of direct
utility functions). We thank Don Brown for revealing this to us in a private conversation.
6 Given that wht ∈ R+ and bht ∈ R++, condition (2.B.2) implies that p′tqt ≥ aht . This is intuitive if one
wants to interpret aht as a subsistence expenditure.
7 Specifically, under nonproportional price movements, condition (2.B.3) becomes redundant. Then, one
can easily verify that, for any given solution for the Afriat inequalities (2.B.1), there also exists a solution
for condition (2.B.2).
8 At this point it is worth recalling that we focus on preferences taking the Gorman Polar Form for income
values within bounded ranges, which here means that this equivalence has a local nature by construction.
The bounds on the income values can be determined by a standard sensitivity analysis of linear programming
results (see Appendix 1 for a more detailed discussion).
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2.2 Exact linear aggregation
We can now use these insights to provide the revealed preference counterpart of
Gorman’s conditions for exact linear aggregation. As stressed above, exact linear
aggregation implies that aggregate demand only depends on prices and aggregate
income and is thus independent of the income distribution. Formally, this implies that
aggregate demand can be written in the simple form Q = g (p,Y ), where g (p,Y ) is a
vector-valued demand equation that only depends on aggregate income Y = ∑h∈η yh
and prices p. In other words, any income distribution of a given Y gives rise to the
same aggregate demands Q.
Gorman proved that such exact linear aggregation holds if and only if consumers’
preferences are of the Gorman Polar Form with common slopes for the linear Engel
curves. This is translated formally in the following definition:




t∈τ satisfy the conditions
for exact linear aggregation if, for each h ∈ η, the data are rationalisable by the
Gorman Polar Form and, moreover, the associated indirect utility functions are given
by wh(p, yh) = yh−ah(p)b(p) , i.e. we have bh(p) = b(p).
In terms of Definition 2, exact linear aggregation requires a common b (p) index
for all consumers (i.e. bh (p) = b (p) for all h). The idea is that the marginal utility
of income must be independent of income variations across consumers but can vary
with prices. Using Theorem 2, we get the following characterisation of exact linear
aggregation in revealed preference terms.









t∈τ satisfy the conditions for exact linear aggregation.
(3.B). For all t ∈ τ and h ∈ η, there exist numbers wht ∈ R+, aht ∈ R and bt ∈ R++
such that for all s, t ∈ τ :














aht = δahs and bt = δbs if pt = δps for δ ∈ R++. (3.B.3)
As compared to Theorem 2, the key requirement is that the Afriat number bt is com-
mon across consumers who face the same prices (i.e. bht = bt for all h). Referring to
Definition 2, this effectively imposes Gorman Polar Form preferences with a common
b (p) index for all consumers. We note, finally, that our characterisation in Theorem 3
can be linearised in a directly similar way as our earlier characterisation in Theorem
2. As such, it implies an easy-to-apply linear test for exact linear aggregation.
123
SERIEs (2016) 7:203–220 211
Interestingly, the characterisation in Theorem 3 also generalises several special
cases that generate the same independence of the income distribution. Two impor-
tant examples are Varian’s (1983) revealed preference characterisation of identical
homothetic preferences (where ah (p) = 0 in Definition 2) and Brown and Cal-
samiglia’s (2007) revealed preference characterisation of quasi-linear preferences
(where ah (p) = −piφ (p) and bh (p) = pi , with pi the price of the numeraire
and φ a function that is homogeneous of degree one).
Finally, from the characterisation in Theorem 3 we obtain that, if observed price
movements are nonproportional, then a necessary and sufficient condition for exact
linear aggregation is that each consumer satisfies the standard Afriat inequalities with
a common marginal utility of income. This is formally stated in the following result:






t∈τ satisfy the conditions for exact linear aggregation.
(B). For all t ∈ τ and h ∈ η, there exist numbers wht ∈ R+ and bt ∈ R++ such that
for all s, t ∈ τ :









In the previous section we established the revealed preference conditions for exact
linear aggregation. Importantly, our characterisation can be linearised in unknowns,
which makes it easily testable. We will next illustrate our revealed preference based
aggregation results bymeans of an empirical application.Here, it isworth to recall from
our discussion in the Introduction that revealed preference methods are intrinsically
“nonparametric”: in contrast to themore standard functional-derivative basedmethods,
they do not need auxiliary parametric or statistical assumptions. As such, this empirical
revealed preference analysis should thus lead to robust conclusions.
3.1 The data
The data we use are drawn from the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey
(ECPF). This is one of the few surveys with detailed expenditure information for a
panel of households. The ECPF is a quarterly budget survey of Spanish households
which interviews about 3200 households every quarter. We focus on a subsample of
couples (with or without children), in which the husband is in full-time employment
in a non-agricultural activity while the wife is out of the labour force.9 Note that we
9 Thus, our empirical analysis uses households/families as consumers.AsSamuelson (1947, p. 224) pointed
out, “Attention should also be called to the fact that even the classical economist does not literally have the
individual in mind, so much as the family; of course, some hardy souls will pursue the will-o’-the-wisp of
sovereignty within the family so as to reduce even these collective indifference curves to an individualistic
basis”. See Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2011) for a revealed preference characterisation of
Chiappori’s (1988) model of collective household consumption that starts from an individualistic basis.
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assume that household preferences over consumption are separable from labour supply
decisions. Therefore we want to minimise the impact of this assumption by keeping
the employment status constant over the whole observation period.
Given the construction of the ECPF, households can be interviewed for up to eight
consecutive quarters. However, our sample would be rather small if we would focus
on those households observed for a full eight periods. Therefore, we have drawn a bal-
anced panel of 342 households which are observed five consecutive quarters in order
to balance the desire for a reasonable number of observations both across households
and time. This implies that we (only) assume stable preferences over a period of five
quarters.10 Finally, in what follows, we focus on a set of 15 nondurable commodity
groups.11 We note that the movements in the observed price vectors are nonpropor-
tional.
Our following analysis proceeds in two steps. First we check, individual household
by individual household, whether observed behaviour is rationalisable by the Gorman
Polar Form, albeit with heterogeneous bh(p) indices for the different households. In
the second step we then pool the data across households to investigate the conditions
for exact linear aggregation.
3.2 Rationalisability by the Gorman Polar Form
For every household in our sample we test whether their behaviour is rationalisable by
preferences of the Gorman Polar Form. There are two important points to note about
this procedure. Firstly, since there are no proportional price movements observed
in the data, this is equivalent to testing whether the data satisfy the standard Afriat
inequalities (see our discussion at the end of Sect. 2.1).12 Secondly, we deal with each
household individually and so we allow for complete preference heterogeneity within
theGorman class: householdsmaydifferwith respect towhether they are rationalisable
(by this class) and the precise form of their preferences within this class. The results
are presented in Table 1.
10 Relaxing this assumption to allow for changing preferences is not straightforward. Basically, the revealed
preference characterization of exact linear aggregation under changing preferences obtains a set of nonlinear
Afriat inequalities, which is difficult to implement empirically. Of course, an easy to implement necessary
test for stable preferences over subperiods (and thus changing preferences over the whole period) consists
of partitioning the set of observations in correspondingly defined subsets, and test our original revealed
preference characterization on these smaller sets.
11 Household preferences over these commodity groups are assumed to be stable over time and separable
from durable goods. The commodity groups are (1) food and non-alcoholic drinks at home; (2) alcohol; (3)
tobacco; (4) energy at home (heating by electricity); (5) services at home (heating: not electricity, water,
furniture repair); (6) nondurables at home (cleaning products); (7) non-durable medicines; (8) medical ser-
vices; (9) transportation; (10) petrol; (11) leisure (cinema, theatre, clubs for sports); (12) personal services;
(13) personal nondurables (toothpaste, soap); (14) restaurants and bars and (15) travelling (holiday).
12 We recall from our discussion in the beginning of Sect. 2 that this equivalence is “local” as it only
holds for sufficiently small changes of the individuals’ incomes. In the proof of Theorem 2, we indicate
that corresponding income bounds can be obtained by standard methods for sensitivity analysis of linear
programs. For compactness, we do not pursue this here, also because our main focus is on checking behav-
ioural consistency with exact linear aggregation, and our following investigation will show that such exact
aggregation is rejected evenwhen (only) using our local characterization ofGorman Polar Formpreferences.
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It turns out that the behaviour of 95% of the households in our data is rationalisable
by preferences of theGormanPolar Form.A little under 5%of the data (16 households)
are not rationalisable by well-behaved preferences at all. Given the estimates of these
proportions, we can also compute the corresponding standard errors of this Bernoulli
experiment, which are reported in parentheses.We see that the small number of failures
we observe in this sample is subject to sampling variation: it might easily be the case
that another similarly sized random sample of households from this population would
contain no failures at all. Since it is a necessary condition for exact linear aggregation
that individual households act as if they are utility maximisers, we therefore do not
include these 16 households in the further analysis.13
3.3 Testing for exact linear aggregation
We now turn to the main question - given microdata with rational agents does the
observed behaviour support exact linear aggregation? In other words, is their aggre-
gate demand independent of the income distribution? To do this we check the condition
that is given in Theorem 3. At this point the test requires pooling across households so
that we can investigate the commonality of the marginal utility of incomes within the
sample. Specifically, we need to check for the data pooled across households whether
there exist numbers wht ∈ R+ for h = 1, ..., 326 and t = 1, ..., 5 and bt ∈ R++ for
t = 1, ..., 5 such that,








for all observations s, t ∈ τ and all households. To do this we use phase one of the
simplex method linear programming algorithm, which efficiently determines whether
or not a system of linear inequalities has a basic feasible solution. We find that this
condition is rejected. Despite the fact that these households all satisfy the necessary
condition (Gorman Polar Form preferences), and despite the very flexible nature of
revealed preference tests, it seems that the additional restriction required for aggre-
gation (that within a period all households have the same bt parameter) is too much:
data cannot bear the weight of the theory required for exact linear aggregation.
3.4 Preference heterogeneity
Given that the behaviour of our remaining households is precisely consistent with
the idea that they have preferences of the Gorman Polar Form albeit with different
13 An alternative would be to impose rationalisability on them. Blundell et al. (2008) describe a way to do
this. In this case, and in view of the very small number of such households, we opted for simplicity.
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preferences within that class, we now turn to the issue of heterogeneity. The focus
is on the heterogeneity which is relevant for aggregation, namely heterogeneity with
respect to the marginal utility of income.
Partitioning on observables. To the extent that heterogeneity in the bt parametermight
be driven by observables, stratification is a flexible and fully nonparametric way in
which to allow for this –the idea being that exact linear aggregation might be valid
when applied to sub-groups of demographically similar households, even thoughwhen
applied to the data in toto it is rejected. To investigate this further we allocated the
data to relatively homogeneous groups on the basis of observables such as their age
profiles, schooling level, household size and number of children. This resulted in 52
groups of which 34 groups contain more than one household (see Appendix 2 for
the frequency distribution of the group sizes). We then test the conditions for exact
linear aggregation once more but this time within each of these groups. Although the
number of different households within a group can be as small as two, as long as there
is more than one household the conditions for exact linear aggregation always fail.
This despite the fact that the strength of revealed preference tests in general (weakly)
increases with the number of observations, so that reducing the number of households
involved in a test, by considering only those with similar observables, should make it
easier to rationalise behaviour.
Partitioning on unobservables. We also consider a second partitioning exercise. As
before, the idea is to partition our set of 326 rational households into a number of
subsets, such that each subset contains households which, together, are exactly linearly
aggregable. Instead of partitioning on observables we use an algorithmwhich searches
for the most parsimonious grouping, i.e. one that minimises the number of groups
required to exclusively and exhaustively partition the data into groups within which
behaviour is aggregable. Of course, the only way to determine this precisely is to
form the set of all subsets of the data (and there are 2326 of these) and to check all of
them.
Since this is computationally infeasible we adapt an easy to implement algo-
rithm developed by Crawford and Pendakur (2013). These authors present a revealed
preference-based method that bounds the minimal partition of consumer microdata
into a set of preference types such that each subset is perfectly rationalisable by stan-
dard utility maximization. This provides a simple, non-parametric and theory-driven
way of investigating unobserved preference heterogeneity in empirical data. We adapt
this algorithm to our setting (i.e. replace the revealed preference conditions for utility
maximization by the ones of exact linear aggregation) and as such we can calculate
bounds on the minimal number of aggregable groups.
We find that the fewest number of groups we need to rationalise the data is some-
where between 90 and 103. Clearly 52 /∈ [90, 103] and this is why our attempt to
rationalise the data on the previous demographics-based partition failed. On average,
there are fewer than 4 households per aggregable subset, and the largest group we
were able to construct consisted of 19 households. Essentially, this outcome says that
we need a substantial number of groups (including many singletons) to rationalise our
data in terms of exact linear aggregation.
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Interpretation. Generally, our results appear to indicate that heterogeneity in the mar-
ginal utility of income is both essentially idiosyncratic and economically meaningful
in the sense that it is sufficient, firstly, to be easily detectable with a nonparamet-
ric/revealed preference test and, secondly, to prevent exact linear aggregation from
going through.
It is interesting to interpret this finding in the light of recent developments in the
macroeconomics literature. The advent of more powerful computers and improved
numerical methods did not only give birth to the field of microeconometrics, but it
also allowed macroeconomists to shift attention towards rich heterogeneous agents
models. Nowadays, one of the main workhorse models for studying heterogeneity
in macroeconomics is what Heathcote et al. (2009) call the “standard incomplete
markets” (SIM) model (see also Ríos-Rull 1995; Ljungqvist and Sargent 2004, and
Krusell and Smith 2006). The SIM model is characterised by a continuum of indi-
viduals (households), who have different preferences and who differ with respect
to characteristics like productivity or health status. These individuals then are faced
with independent uninsurable shocks in their endowments, which lead to behavioural
changes at the micro level and, ultimately, also at the macro level. By construction, our
nonparametricmethod allows for considerablymore heterogeneity then in the standard
SIM model. However, even in our minimalisatic set-up, we still reject exactly aggre-
gable behavior unless we explicitly account for (unobservable) heterogeneity across
households. In our opinion, we may take our results as providing specific empirical
support for using (SIM-type) macroeconomic models with a continuum of heteroge-
nous households.
Related to this, our results can also be interpreted as revealed preference evidence
against the existence of a representative agent.14 If the conditions for linear exact
aggregation are satisfied, then there exists a representative agent for which the aggre-
gate demand can be modelled as the outcome of rational, maximising behaviour given
prices and aggregate income. Importantly, this representative agent also allows for
normative conclusions: the agent’s preferences can properly be represented by an
aggregate social welfare function.15 As such, our empirical results also complement
the overwhelming evidence against the existence such a representative agent (see, for
example, Kirman 1992, and Carroll 2000). More specifically, they add that even the
existence of a limited set of representative agents seems to be a very unrealistic hypoth-
esis. As indicated above, because our test is intrinsically nonparametric, it provides
robust evidence in support of this conclusion.
14 Notwithstanding the shift towards heterogeneous agents models, it is fair to say the representative
consumer still plays an important role in a number ofmodernmacroeconomicmodels and inmacroeconomic
textbooks (see, for example, Clarida et al. 1999; Woodford 2003; Uhlig 2010, and Gourio 2012).
15 See, for example, Dow and Werlang (1988), Kirman (1992) and Jerison (1994) for more discussion on
representative agents and how this relates to exact linear aggregation. Note that the quest for a normatively
significant representative consumer is different from that to a positive representative consumer. In Maliar
and Maliar (2003), for example, conditions are derived that allow to describe the aggregate behaviour of
heterogeneous consumers by means of a representative consumer who is faced with preference, technol-
ogy and labor shocks. Although this approach allows to make predictions with respect to the aggregate
economy in an easier way, the underlying ‘social welfare function’ that represents the preferences of the
‘representative’ consumer is not normatively significant.
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4 Conclusion
Many economic models use the assumption that aggregate demand depends solely on
prices and aggregate income and, thus, abstract from income-distributional effects.
Although the conditions for the existence of such a distribution-independent aggrega-
tion have been argued to be demanding, it is fair to say that existing evidence is solely
based on Gorman’s well-known exact linear aggregation results within a functional-
derivative based framework. To test Gorman’s conditions for exact linear aggregation
(which boil down to consumers having preferences of the Gorman Polar Form with
an equal marginal utility of income), one needs to make many additional assumptions
to bring these conditions to the data.
In this paper, we revisited the problem of exact linear aggregation by bringing in
tools from the revealed preference literature. These tools are based solely on the data
at hand and do not need any additional parametric or statistical assumptions. As such,
they allow for robustly analysing the empirical validity of exact linear aggregation. In
addition to a few interesting and rather important side results (like a revealed preference
characterisation of Gorman Polar Form preferences for an individual consumer), we
proposed a revealed preference test for exact linear aggregation. Interestingly, the test
is linear and thus easy-to-apply in practice.
We demonstrated the practical usefulness of our revealed preference characterisa-
tion by means of an empirical application to a Spanish balanced microdata panel. Our
main conclusion is that we could not find any evidence suggesting the existence of a
limited set of household types for which aggregate demand can be modelled as inde-
pendent of the income distribution. That is, our conditions for exact linear aggregation
are not satisfied for our sample, and the same result holds even when considering
small groups of households defined in terms of observable characteristics. Moreover,
even an algorithmic approach designed to group the data as efficiently as possible
into aggregable groups failed to find a parsimonious grouping. We may interpret these
results as providing empirical support for (e.g. SIM) macroeconomic models that
are based on a continuum of consumers rather than a limited set of representative
agents.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Theorem 2 As a preliminary step, we provide an equivalent linear formula-
tion of the conditions in (2.B) . Let αht = −aht /bht and βht = 1/bht . Then we get the
following linear reformulations of the conditions (2.B.1) – (2.B.3):










αht = αhs and βht = βhs /δ if pt = δps for δ ∈ R++. (2.B.3’)
(2.A) ⇒ (2.B) : Condition (2.B.1’) readily follows Theorem 1 for a utility function




t∈τ . Then, we can use w
h
t = maxq{uh (q) |p′tq ≤
p′tqht } (usingp′tqht = yht ). Given this, Definition 2 directly implies (2.B.2’) and (2.B.3’)
when using αt = −ah(pt )/bh(pt ) and βht = 1/bh(pt ).
(2.B) ⇒ (2.A) : Consider
uh (q) = min
t










Using (2.B.2’), we have
uh (q) = min
t
[αht + βht p′tq]. (1)
Let us then verify whether the function uh satisfies Definition 2. Consider some
arbitrary prices p0 and income yh0 . As a preliminary step, we recall that
wh(p0, yh0 ) = maxq {u
h (q) |p′0q ≤ yh0 }.
Thus, using (1), we get




[αht + βht p′tq]|p′0q ≤ yh0
}
.
We can equivalently state this as
wh(p0, yh0 ) = maxw,q
{
w|w ≤ αht + βht p′tq (∀t ∈ τ) , p′0q ≤ yh0
}
,
which obtains the linear program
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w − βht p′tq ≤ αht (∀t ∈ τ) ,
p′0q ≤ yh0 .
The dual linear program is given as





t θt + λyh0
s.t.
∑T





t pt + λp0 ≥ 0. (3)
Let θ∗t (t ∈ τ) and λ∗ define the optimum of program (3). In general, these optimal
values are independent of yh0 when y
h
0 respects conditions that limit the domain of y
h
0 .
In practice, the boundary values for yh0 can be determined by standardmethodology for
sensitivity analysis of linear programming. (Technically, these bounds will correspond
to the range of yh0 (as the objective coefficient of λ) for which the optimal basic feasible
solution of the linear program (3) remains constant.) These domain conditions parallel
the usual conditions that apply to indirect utility functions representing Gorman Polar
Form preferences; see our discussion following Definition 2 in the main text.
Thus, because the solution of the problem (3) is independent of yh0 (under the stated
domain conditions), we conclude that the function wh in (3) satisfies the requirement
in Definition 2 for




Specifically, for w∗ the optimal value of linear program (3 ) [or, equivalently, (2)], we
get













Inspection of problems (2) and (3) reveals that the price indices ah and bh are linearly
homogenous of degree 1 (if again the same income domain conditions hold). 
unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3 This follows from Theorem 2 (i.e. each household is rationalis-
able by the Gorman Polar Form) and the result of Gorman (i.e. the marginal utility of
income is household independent, which is captured by the common bt (i.e. bht = bt
for all h)). 
unionsq
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Proof of Corollary 1 Condition (3.B.3) in Theorem 2 is void if pt = δps (δ ∈ R++)
for all s, t ∈ τ . Moreover, any solution for condition (3.B.1) automatically satisfies




t − wht bht . As such, rationalisability
under exact linear aggregation only requires consistency with the condition (3.B.1).
We remark that this equivalence result is only local, as already discussed in the begin-
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